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1. Introduction  
This bachelor thesis deals with the British political mood towards the European Union 
which has been labelled "the Euroscepticism". It is focused on the historical development 
and changes of this process in Great Britain and analyses the relationship between the 
country and the EU during the offices of different governments. The central objective is 
to describe the Euroscepticism, to name the main reasons for its growth and try to find an 
answer to the main question of this thesis: Will Britain eventually pull out of the 
European Union?  
The Euroscepticism is a widely known political phenomenon which is characterized by a 
strong opposition towards the European integration process. The main source of the 
Euroscepticism has been the notion that integration weakens the nation state. It has 
become apparent that citizens have become more aware of the policy decisions being 
made at the EU level (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 5). This political movement is 
widespread in a number of different European countries and among different 
governments, but its roots stem from British political life. The thesis also deals with 
British exceptionalism which can be seen as a reason of the Euroscepticism.  
The first part of this work examines a variety of the Euroscepticism’s definitions created 
by different authors. Furthermore, the thesis defines what the Euroscepticism means, how 
it has emerged and what were the implications on the British political arena. However, it 
must be stated that there is no agreement on a single definition, which is why it is 
appropriate to choose one definition, around which this thesis will be constructed.  
In the second chapter readers can find information about British Euroscepticism in the 
1980s and 1990s. Legislative changes, such as Maastricht Treaty or implications of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, in the European Community caused an enormous critical 
wave in Britain. Conservative political leaders, M. Thatcher or J. Major, led their 
governments in a slightly reformed, but still traditional and conservative way and they 
did not support deeper integration into the European structure. It was a period called 
British state crisis in the European Community, but it in reality it was a crisis of the 
Conservative party and political system in general. In this chapter readers also can find 
providing information about organizations in the Conservative Party during Major’s 
government which influenced the growth of Euroscepticism. This thesis provides basic 
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arguments as to why they were the Eurosceptical and how this affected Britain's 
relationship with the EU.  
The subsequent section introduces an attempt to reassert Great Britain as a hegemonic 
European country. The Prime Minister, T. Blair, created this political stance as he tried to 
initiate a building of huge coalitions, including both Western and Eastern European 
countries as an opposition towards deeper integration. His main goal was to construct 
Anglo-European hegemony with a special relationship with the U.S. However, his policy 
mainly concentrated on US-British relations, which led to the collapse of the idea of 
Anglo-European hegemony (Gifford 2008: 139–140).  
The next chapter discusses the contemporary government which is described as a soft 
Eurosceptical governmental body. Since his earliest speeches, David Cameron has been 
marked as a Eurosceptical person. He was always one of those, who opposed Labour 
decisions and the common security, social, judiciary and foreign policies of the EU. 
When he came to power, he described himself as the Eurosceptic, but a practical and 
sensible one at the same time (Lynch 2011: 220–222). For better understanding of 
contemporary British policy towards the EU is quite important to name and discuss the 
main source of scepticism – United Kingdom Independence Party. While the UKIP does 
not have strength to rule the government, its stance is very influential in EP’s elections 
and effectively appeals to British public in a period of weakened Coalition government. 
Finally, the last section analyses Britain's attitude today towards the EU based on opinion 
polls and historical experience. This information will help us to achieve our main goal 
which is to predict the results of a possible referendum about Britain's membership of the 
EU. 
This bachelor thesis is written using a case study design. According to Yin a case study 
design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and 
“why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study; 
(c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the 
phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon 
and context (Yin, 2008: 4–5). However, case studies have a lot of branches and, as such, 
this thesis operates using explanatory and single-case studies. Explanatory case studies 
provide further background information and help us to understand the logic of the 
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process and its development (Yin, 2008: 6). Single country descriptions of politics (or 
single-case studies) are used as the main method of writing. It is the best suited method, 
in this case, because it provides the base for the study of one issue - the analysis of one 
country and its political stance. 
As this work illustrates the concept of Euroscepticism, it could appeal to the general 
public, the academic community of social scientists or students - especially those who are 
interested in the political life of Britain. Based on the single country description of 
politics (single-case study) readers can find information about Britain’s difficulties with 
membership in the European Union. It should be noted that this thesis is based on a 
dichotomy of Euroscepticism, called hard vs. soft Euroscepticism, which will be 
described in the first chapter. 
The main goal of this thesis is to answer the question of whether or not Britain will 
eventually pull out of the European Union and to provide the analysis of growing 
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2. The concept of Euroscepticism 
 2.1. Definition of Euroscepticism 
The Euroscepticism is often described as opposition to an integrated Europe, which 
focuses on two interrelated processes – economic and political integration within Europe. 
This term is used to describe opponents of European integration related to both 
opportunity and principles (Forster 2002: 7). Across the European Union there has been a 
prominent and increasingly highlighted rise in critical attitudes towards integration. 
While criticism of European integration has always existed to varying extents in different 
states, the two decades since the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty have witnessed a more widespread and vocal sсepticism about the benefits of the 
European Union. This scepticism was evident in the 2005 referendums in France and the 
Netherlands that saw the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and in the 2008 Irish 
referendum rejection of the Lisbon Treaty.1  
These processes can be divided by Taggart and Szczerbiak’s classification of 
Euroscepticism – soft vs. hard. Hard Euroscepticism means opposition towards 
everything about EU integration, supports a complete withdrawal from membership and 
the development of a strong national policy. The soft version of this phenomenon is 
against some specific aspects of integration into the policies of the EU, policy outcomes 
or institutional features and seeks to reform the EU rather than abolish the entire project; 
it can be referred to as 'a defence of national interest' (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 2). 
Szczebiak and Taggart also discuss two main features of Euroscepticism. The first one is 
an extension of new policies resulting in a new populism or neo-fascism. In connection 
with this, Mair talks about modern politics and new policies, which are introduced by 
different points of view and represent popular democracy. Those steps are struggling 
with a constitutional one. While constitutional democracy needs institutional 
requirements for good governance, popular democracy depends only on the will of the 
people. This process causes the decline of party politics; parties became more dependent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Torreblanca, Jose Ignacio – Leonard, Mark, eds (2013). The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism. ECFR 
[online]. May 2013 [cit. 12. 03. 2014]. Available from http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf., page 1-2, 4. 
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on different organisations and agencies, and afterwards are transformed into populistic 
units thanks to national appeal (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 12-13; Mair in Gifford 
2008: 8-9).  
The second feature lies in the position and structure of political parties and the party 
system. An example of this is the situation in which certain members of the party are 
against the EU, but in general the party is not (Gifford 2008: 6). These tendencies can be 
seen as the alleged existence of a democratic deficit within the EU. Decisions are now 
often taken by unaccountable institutions rather than elected national governments. 
Citizens of different regions have recognised this and begun to use EU institutions to 
advance their own interests.2  
Another effort to define the entire range of Eurosceptic possibilities is built on the 
distinction between European integration as an ideal, and the European Union as an 
existing set of institutions.  Kopecky and Mudde describe Euroscepticism as one of four 
ideal types produced by intersecting orientations towards the European Union (EU 
optimism/pessimism) with orientations towards the idea of European integration 
(Europhilia /Europhobia.)  This produces four ideal types; “Eurorejects” who oppose the 
ideal of integration and the reality of the EU, “Euroenthusisasts” who support both the 
EU and the ideal of ever closer union, “Europragmatists” who do not support integration, 
but view the EU as useful, and “Eurosceptics” who support the idea of integration, but 
not its realization through the current EU.  While this conceptualization has the 
theoretical appeal of separating out Europe from the actual EU, this distinction often 
appears in actual political debate (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 301–303). 
Of course, there are more definitions of this phenomenon. Agnes Alexandre-Collier 
states: “a Eurosceptic is someone who doubts the utility and viability of Economic and 
Political Union” (Agnes Alexandre-Collier in Forster 2002: 2). She defines three 
important parts of Euroscepticism. First, it supposes that the critique is related to two 
interconnected processes – economic and political integration. Secondly, it links this 
critique to the transformation of the EC into the EU in 1993. Finally, it implies that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Torreblanca, Jose Ignacio – Leonard, Mark, eds (2013). The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism. ECFR 
[online]. May 2013 [cit. 12. 03. 2014]. Available from http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf., p. 1. 
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Eurosceptics can be found only in the Conservative Party. Unfortunately, nowadays it is 
evident that this definition and its variables fail (Agnes Alexandre-Collier in Forster 
2002: 2).  
Recent research conducted by Anthony Forster argues that Euroscepticism has a multi-
faceted nature, which is a key to longevity. It can be seen through different contexts, such 
as the questioning of involvement in European integration projects, doubts about 
membership of the EU community, the competence of some governmental bodies of the 
EC/the EU, disengagement and withdrawal. This study clearly shows that there is a 
strong division among sceptics (Forster 2002: 2). 
A related view is that Euroscepticism is frequently based on a misunderstanding of 
developments within the European Union. In a study of the 2008 Irish referendum, for 
example, John O’Brennan highlighted Irish citizens’ ignorance of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
contents as being a significant cause of their rejection of the treaty (O’Brennan, 2009: 
270). He argues that “although the Irish remain among the most enthusiastic about EU 
membership, there remains a significant knowledge vacuum, with a large majority of 
citizens professing to know little or nothing about how decisions are made at the EU 
level and how EU institutions function” (O’Brennan, 2009: 270). Therefore, according to 
this analysis, the lack of popular understanding of the European Union and European 
integration may leave space for political groups and parties to gain support by 
misrepresenting the development of integration.  
In one study by Taggart and Szczerbiak, the findings were that Euroscepticism is 
frequently most likely to be adopted by protest-based parties that stand at the fringes of 
the existing party system and which are outside of government. In this view, 
Euroscepticism is part of a more general opposition to existing political systems and 
leadership structures and may be adopted by these protest-parties or populist-parties in 
order to secure electoral support. Taggart further argues that these parties are structures, 
which adopted the EU issue as a secondary appropriative issue to strengthen their 
position among the political core  (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 256-258). 
The question has arisen: Why is this phenomenon so popular nowadays? The answer can 
be found in the work of Anthony Forster, in which he argues that the contemporary 
ability of Eurosceptics to create and afterward successfully use resources has been a 
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major factor in mounting an effective public campaign against the government. New 
technologies of the twenty-first century provide the easiest access to a range of resources 
and help Eurosceptics to more effectively challenge pro-European groups. 
Euroscepticism has, as a result, become a campaigning force, not simply a point of view. 
Opposition groups have begun to study all proposed EU decisions based on an analysis of 
policy-making, decisions and Treaty outcomes. All of these mean that Euroscepticism as 
a point of view and as a general attitude have become a political trend with an enormous 
research base (Forster 2002: 8). 
In conclusion, it should be said, that there is no clear definition of this phenomenon. 
There is a big diversity in characteristics but in this analysis the concept of hard and soft 
Euroscepticism will be used, which is the most appropriate for further analysis. 
 
2.2. British Euroscepticism 
British Euroscepticism founded this phenomenon. Many authors conducted their research 
and tried to give a definition, date its formation and explain its popularity and rise, but 
there is still no agreement between them. This is because it is a challenge to describe a 
phenomenon, which grows fast and spreads even faster. This thesis operates with the 
most prevalent current view whilst still acknowledging others. 
Mark Corner argues that the birth of British Euroscepticism can be traced back to the end 
of World War Two, when the European community was still feeling the impact of such a 
brutal and unforgiving conflict. The question for Europe was how to contain Germany 
and let it grow strong again without growing dangerous. The best solution was to allow it 
to recover the European auspices. Nowhere did this have as strong an impact as in 
Britain. The defeat of Nazi Germany for British people had been seen as a single-handed 
effort with (eventually) help from the USSR and the US, plus of course considerable 
contingents from the Empire/Commonwealth. There is no doubt that this perception still 
lives on in the British psyche. (Corner 2007: 466-468). What followed can be called a 
'first period', which emerged in Macmillan’s government, when the UK first applied to 
join the EC in 1961. This period ended with a referendum in 1975 (Forster 2002: 3). Hall, 
for example, argues that post-imperial crisis was one of the reasons, why Euroscepticism 
emerged during that period. It was characterized by the declining legitimacy of the elite, 
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de-alignment, electoral volatility and the enormous rise of factionalism within the main 
political parties. It was seen as a crisis of hegemony within Britain (Hall 1979: 15–16). 
However, the overwhelming majority of scientists see the rise of this phenomenon as 
taking off in the 1980s, especially after Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech, which 
brought the European issue back to the forefront. This second period, around which the 
thesis will focus, was marked by her speech and continued opposition to the Maastricht 
Treaty (Forster 2002: 3).  
Most recently, a contemporary period began with Cameron-Clegg’s government. After 
years of Blair’s attempt to reassert Britain as a bridge between Europe and the US, 
Britain found itself lost. The economic crisis in 2008 showed that European Union 
countries’ economics were underestimated. David Cameron is now trying to gain public 
support and that is why he uses this hot question in his agenda (Lee and Beech, eds. 
2011: 218).  The discussions about a possible referendum about contemporary British 
attitudes towards the EU are the main focus of this work. 
According to Bulpitt and Buller, there are five schools of thoughts that have divided the 
view of Euroscepticism in Britain, explained the problematic relationship between the 
UK and the EU and presented a partial or misleading picture of its influence (Bulpitt and 
Buller in Forster 2002: 3). The first, ‘behaviouralist’ school “has focused on the 
importance of leadership behaviour and placed emphasis on the way in which key 
players have viewed the world, their attitudes and values” (Backer and Seawright in 
Forster 2002: 3). Such study sees the problem of membership in weak political 
motivation and little commitment among the general public or the elite. Their arguments 
lay in a membership debate in the 1960s, when the political elite was not able to gain a 
majority and create a stable platform with which to introduce Britain’s European Policy. 
However, it should be said that these studies ignore significant party and institutional 
considerations, which led to scepticism, and also the significance of political economic 
issues created around European integration (Forster 2002: 4). 
The second, ‘party’ school focuses “on political parties as the source of the difficulties in 
Britain’s relationship with the Europe” (Forster 2002: 4). The author sees the problem in 
the attitude of the Labour or Conservative Party towards the EU. They are prepared to 
integrate, but their national programs or values, which they are representing, are opposite 
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to the position of the European Union. The main issues in question are defense, border 
control, citizenship and money, which are especially sensitive symbols of national 
sovereignty. However, reality has shown that the UK's position towards European issues 
has an inter-party nature, and that such opposition has been debated and carefully 
orchestrated (Forster 2002: 4).  
The third group is called ‘institutionalist’. They draw their attention to the structural 
explanations as “the cause of Britain’s problematic relationship with integration project” 
(Forster 2002: 4). Representatives of this group, Stuart Wilks or Mark Aspinwall, state 
that British political structures and majoritarian electoral system are the causes of the 
problem. The opposition and the government in Britain should be rivals, which is why 
their policies and attitudes should be different and competing with each other (Wilks in 
Forster 2002: 4; Aspinwall 2000: 415). This mismatch leads to the formation of radical 
parties, such as UKIP, or extra party groups. These ideas bring an explanation about the 
decline of some parties and the flow of scepticism, but cannot offer explanations of 
British Euroscepticism relating to European policies (Usherwood in Forster 2002: 5). 
The fourth group which has only recently emerged, is based on the international political 
economy approach. The conclusions drawn from their findings are that British economic 
structures are different and find themselves in opposition to European industrial models. 
This school is going beyond political structure and elites, and offers a new approach 
(Forster 2002: 5). 
The fifth ‘conjunctive’ group offers explanations to the reader based on the interplay 
between domestic and international factors, such as the decline of British hegemony, the 
concerns of domestic policymakers, national appeal, the activities of interest groups and 
economic trends (Gowland and Turner 2000: 7). Some of the drawbacks of the arguments 
of this group are that they lack systematic explanations for the role and influence of 
groups on governmental policy (Forster 2002: 6).  
These conventional groups have a number of weaknesses, but all are agreed that every 
British government, which comes into power, even if they were not Eurosceptical at the 
onset of their term of office, became more or less sceptical of intergovernmental 
structures (Forster 2002: 6). This happens because EU membership hasn’t delivered the 
benefits, which were predicted, but has led to a loss of sovereignty as well as making the 
	   12	  
autonomy of democratic decision-making more visible (Baimbridge, Burkitt and 
Whyman 2006: 402).  
In spite of this classification, scepticism has had important indirect effects on British 
policy. Sceptics, with their strong voices, have been challenging, shaping and 
constructing the character of the British debate on Europe. They have effectively 
destabilized the political parties, effectively leading to sizeable factions in the two major 
parties – Conservatives and Labour, causing serious issues for both parties. 
Euroscepticism, with its own policy-making body, has introduced to Britain a new form 
of shadow government, which is now very strong and which has a strong influence on the 
domestic political arena (Forster 2002: 8).  
Moreover, a close relationship with Europe and membership of the EU has had an impact 
on British business and government. It has forced them to over-concentrate on the EU, 
causing them to neglect relationships with other, potentially significant parts of the 
world. Also it has become apparent that the British government’s energy was 
concentrated on converging European neighbor economies, rather than on national 
interest in other faster growing countries (Baimbridge, Burkitt and Whyman 2006: 411). 
Ultimately, it should be said, that whilst Euroscepticism is a complex phenomenon, it has 
British roots. There are a lot of classifications, which describe reasons for its growth, the 
effects of this political view and which provide some important arguments about 
Eurosceptics. The most visible effect Euroscepticism is the changing nature of British 
national and foreign policy. Unfortunately, no British government can create strong 
opposition to this movement, because, as stated earlier, EU membership hasn’t delivered 
the predicted benefits. 
 
3. The end of the 1980s and 1990s in Britain - a strong political 
disagreement with the EC. 
The governing Conservative Party, with a strong and innovative leader in Margaret 
Thatcher, defined the 1980s in Britain. Her political ideas were based on “… a clear 
ideological, economic and political break with the Keynesian-Beveridge settlement that 
had placed the extension of the welfare state, full employment and state intervention at the 
centre of British politics” (Gifford 2008: 84). It was a new and creative policy which was 
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developed to change the economic instability and to reanimate British growth and power. It 
was also a reaction against the Fordism initiatives that had failed to resolve the post-
imperial crisis (Gifford 2008: 84, 86). 
The tenure of M. Thatcher in connection with the EC and its policies can be divided into 
two periods. The first period was the period of European policy engagement, the most 
notable point of which was the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in February 
1986. After that Prime Minister Thatcher changed her opinion and moved to a sceptical 
position towards the European Community. She introduced her eurosceptical arguments in 
the Bruges speech on 20 September 1988 (Forster 2002: 63–64). The following subchapter 
focuses closely on this speech by analysing its main points and describing its results. 
However, after Thatcher’s speech, Eurosceptics raised their voices and began to actively 
oppose the Maastricht Treaty. There was a huge debate about the creation of Economic and 
Monetary Political Unions. Subchapter 3.2. will discuss the role of the opposition to both 
Unions and the opportunities they presented, explain the arguments of eurosceptics and 
highlight the most active groups during this period. 
After Thatcher's resignation, the Conservative Party still remained in office. Her successor 
John Major was a pragmatic conservative politician, whose ideas reflected the support 
within the party for the Thatcherite settlement. His role was clearly to unite the various 
factions in the British domestic arena and develop an effective European policy. However, 
these hopes did not become a reality (Forster 2002: 96; Gifford 2008: 108, 111). Major’s 
government implemented a course of action that was disastrous and created “… a 
European crisis for the British state” (Gifford 2008: 111). The subsequent subchapter 
discusses his personal attitude and role in the most Eurosceptical period in Britain. 
 
3.1. Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech 
The Bruges speech was given by Margaret Thatcher at the College of Europe in 
September 1988. This speech started a new phase of Conservative attitude towards the 
EC, characterised by the move from an instrumental and pragmatic position on European 
integration to an ideological one. She moved from an incidental position of membership 
to perceiving it as a threat. During this period the first key steps were taken in the 
movement of the opponents of European integration from an anti-market position to a 
Eurosceptical one. Before the Bruges speech, opponents of integration focused their 
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attention on an anti-market position. Afterwards, however, the critics' position 
transformed into criticism of the Political and Economic Union. It was the dawning of a 
new era of Euroscepticism (Forster 2002: 63–65). 
In Bruges, Margaret Thatcher argued that “willing and active cooperation between 
independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European 
Community”.3 She saw this process as dependent on governments and their judgment as 
to the value of current and future agreements. This point of view was not anti-European, 
but saw the process as dependent on the individual assessment by each government 
involved in the process (Forster 2002: 76). 
However, this speech presented three main critical points toward the European 
Community. The first point discussed the structure of the EC which had opened 
negotiations about closer integration. Thatcher saw the single voice of the Community as 
suppressing nationalism and concentrating power in one centre. She claimed that this was 
a highly damaging phenomenon, which would destroy all previously achieved goals. She 
believed that cooperation should exist, but should be dispersed among nation states in 
order to gain success. The next structural problem for the British Conservatives was the 
possible creation of a Political Union and EMU.  Thatcher told the public that there was 
no need to create new regulations, which would raise the cost of employment and make 
Europe’s labour market less flexible and less competitive with foreign suppliers.4 
The second critical point was based on the current policy problems, faced by the 
Community. The former Prime Minister stated that “ [i]f we cannot reform those 
Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly 
causing public disquiet, than we shall not get the public support for the Community’s 
future development”.5 She believed that the Common Agricultural Policy6 (CAP) was far 
from complete, because of over-production and limited costs. The challenge facing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





6 Common Agricultural Policy – one of the oldest policies of the European Union, is strongly rooted in the European 
integration project. The CAP aimed at encouraging better productivity in the food chain, ensuring fair standard of 
living to the agricultural community, market stabilization and ensuring the availability of food supplies to EU 
consumers at reasonable price. It has been developing through all the history of EC/EU (see Appendix 1) (European 
Commission 2014a). 
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Community was to display political courage and create a stable and effective farming 
industry.7 Also, Thatcher emphasized the need to avoid protectionism and the need to 
encourage enterprise (Forster 2002: 77). 
The third critical feature of the speech was what the EC might become. Thatcher did not 
accept the vision of Europe as a federation like the United States. The most fundamental 
and critical issue related to this vision was the creation of a Western European Union as 
an alternative to NATO. According to Thatcher’s opinion, the WEU “… should be 
developed… as a means of strengthening Europe’s contribution to the common defense of 
the West”.8 
Some international quarters and tabloids hailed the Bruges speech as a milestone in the 
development of British Euroscepticism both in terms of symbolism and objectivism. It 
was not something new in Britain, but these arguments moved Euroscepticism from the 
margins into the mainstream of British politics. This speech connected the small group of 
anti-marketeers with a big group of pragmatic Conservative sceptics centreing around 
sovereignty concerns, which can be called the Eurosceptic agenda (Forster 2002: 77 – 
78). 
After the gaining of broader support in the Conservative Party and amongst the general 
public, the Bruges Group was created by the Oxford undergraduate David Robertson, in 
February 1989. The main goal of this group was to promote Thatcher’s Bruges agenda 
and provide an organizational base for the ideas. The Bruges Group had a subsidiary, 
which was called Friends of the Bruges Group and consisted of MPs. This structure was 
seen as a small party within a party and its purpose was to publish reports and to gain 
support for Thatcher’s ideas.  (Forster 2002: 71; Economic Affairs 1989). 
There are two further features of Euroscepticism, which became important after the 
Bruges speech. Firstly, the growing consolidation surrounding Thatcher’s agenda marked 
a shift away from the domination of the anti-market Labour left to a rightist Eurosceptical 
movement. Secondly, this grouping affected the mainstream media. The weekly and 
weekend editions of the Times or the Telegraph gave a great deal of column space to 	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Eurosceptical writers. In addition, this movement attracted academics, who began to 
debate and to create an analytical framework. This led to a broader support network 
outside Parliament, sparked an intellectual debate and created an environment in which to 
advance the Eurosceptical cause on a multidimensional front (Forster 2002: 72; Baker 
and Seawright 1998: 193–195). 
To summarise, the Bruges speech united different groups of sceptics and established an 
intellectual agenda for opposing European integration. Thatcher became a symbol of the 
new movement, which is still influential in the British domestic arena. By applying 
Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s definition, it could be said that the Conservative Party and its 
leader officially created the soft version of Euroscepticism in British policy. 
 
3.2. Debates before the Maastricht Treaty 
Margaret Thatcher lost her seat in 1990, and thereafter began a period of strong 
opposition towards the government. Her successor John Major was a pragmatic 
Conservative member, who tried to unite both Thatcherite Eurosceptics and European 
sympathisers. However, unfortunately for him, during his leadership period in both the 
domestic arena and in parliament a huge debate began about membership of the Political 
Union of the EC and also about membership of the EMU. He challenged the strong 
dislike and the critics within his own party and, in the 1992 elections, lost the majority of 
votes, which led to him having a minority government (Forster 2002: 83–84; Gifford 
2008: 111, 131).  
For the first time in history, Eurosceptics united their groups and created an analytical 
framework, actively using the media as a propaganda machine and thus, destabilizing the 
government and its position. They fought against the Treaty, which was partly damaging 
their interests. It was a period of British state crisis in the EC which later became the EU. 
This subchapter introduces the debates about the EMU and the Political Union, whilst 
working with the definition of soft versus hard Euroscepticism. 
 
3.2.1. Opposition against the Political Union 
The application of the Maastricht Treaty had one more important purpose for the 
Community – creating a political union, which would unite member states and create 
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common foreign and security policy. However, for British Eurosceptics this meant the 
loss of sovereignty and national identity. As Mrs. Thatcher said in her speech: “We do 
not want the United States of Europe”. 9  It was a common opinion among both 
Conservative and Labour politicians. 
These two kinds of opposition had practically the same arguments. The main focus of the 
political opposition was the situation, in which the range and power ceded to a central 
authority. The scrapping of national currencies led to the creation of the European Union 
in political terms, with common security and foreign policies, the possibility of defense 
capability and justice and home affairs responsibilities, whereas the traditional British 
agenda was only based on the implementation of the Common Market. Sceptics, who 
argued that the lesson from the SEA was not learned, strongly blamed Major’s 
government. They saw expansive Treaty language as a weapon for European federalists. 
Also, the Eurosceptics critique was focused on the government’s lack of attention to 
detail. The attack regarded the fact that the British opt-outs were not as easy as the 
government had suggested (Forster 2002: 93–94). 
In regard to the main Eurosceptic players one of the most active and powerful opposition 
organizations, called The Fresh Start Group, should be mentioned. It was founded by the 
Conservative peer Michael Spicer and had its origins in two EDMs - after the Danish 
referendum in 1992 about the Maastricht Treaty and after the British withdrawal from the 
ERM. The group’s purpose was to oppose the Maastricht IGC with a secondary objective 
to secure a referendum on the treaty and the single currency. The Fresh Start Group was 
well organized, had access to financial resources and created a strong intellectual base. 
They met regularly to coordinate their opposition and drafted amendments to the EC Bill. 
The Fresh Start Group became a party within a party. This group brought to parliament 
some new ground for opposition. Firstly, their mood did not only express displeasure 
with the government’s activities, but also took steps to prevent legislation from being 
acted upon. Secondly, it was a group with independent funds, which changed the 
organizational face of sceptical groups in parliament (Forster 2002: 87–88, Gifford 2008: 
130). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thatcher, Margaret (1988). The Bruges Speech. The Telegraph [online]. September 1988. [cit. 18. 3. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-
speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html. 
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One more factor, which British Eurosceptics of the Political Union wanted to reduce, was 
the social policy in Europe. Thatcher began this argument in her speech and gave an 
explanation of the effects of its implementation, namely that it was an attack on the 
principles of free trade.10 This argument was used once more by Cash, who argued that 
the original free market agenda was replaced by the will of political integration; “they 
want … to create one country” (Gifford 2008: 133). 
In conclusion, it could be said that the Maastricht Treaty was strongly opposed and this 
created a framework, which developed independently and worked not only with 
politicians, but also with the general public. However, the failure of both the 
Conservative and Labour parties to unite their power led to the ratification of the Treaty 
(Forster 2002: 104). This fact contributed to an effective oppositional agenda to the 
EMU. 
 
3.2.2.  Challenging the Economic and Monetary Union 
The Maastricht Treaty (see Appendix 2) was seen on the European stage as the creation 
of a strong and effective body, which would unite and strengthen Europe and its policies. 
Among the articles was a series of steps to create a single currency – the Euro. Articles 
divided the formation of this new system into three stages. The first stage was introduced 
in July 1990 and required the removal of exchange controls and membership in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism. The second stage began in 1994 with the creation of an 
Economic and Monetary Institution (EMI), which played the role of an embryonic bank. 
National banks were removed from political control and governments had until 1996 to 
decide if the majority met the convergence criteria11 for membership of the Euro (see 
Appendix 3), and to agree about the introduction of the Euro. The third stage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Thatcher, Margaret (1988). The Bruges Speech. The Telegraph [online]. September 1988. [cit. 18. 3. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-
speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html. 
11 Convergence criteria are set of macro economic entry conditions, which are designed to ensure that a Member 
State’s economy is sufficiently prepared for adoption of the single currency and can integrate without risk into Euro 
zone. They are intended ensure economic convergence and were agreed by EU Member States in 1991. A euro-area 
candidate country must make changes to national laws and rules, notably governing its national central bank and 
other monetary issues, in order to make them compatible with the Treaty. (European Commission 2014b). 
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implemented the agreement and introduced the new currency. In the case of no 
agreement being reached, the Euro could be automatically implemented and the EMI 
would transform into the European Central Bank (ECB), which would produce money 
and set the interest rates of the Euro zone (Van Bergeijk and Berk 2001: 548–550). 
For British Eurosceptics, the issue of a single currency was really problematic because of 
the adopting of the Maastricht convergence criteria but three factors of this Treaty 
assisted the sceptics. Firstly, the conditions leading to the EMU were clearly set and all 
of the stages required specific action from governments. According to Anthony Forster, a 
key argument of the opposition was that “Britain had been deceived into joining the EC 
by her leaders”, which gave Eurosceptics the opportunity to monitor development and to 
publicly challenge it (Forster 2002: 108).  
The second factor lay in Britain opting-out of the ERM in 1992 and a near collapse of 
this system in 1993. The destruction of the exchange mechanism inflicted damage on 
Britain's economic credibility and cost £4 billion in currency reserves. The government's 
official position was that ERM membership was critical and that it would keep inflation 
under control and bring interest rates down. This position was eventually undermined and 
many sceptics used their power and influence to make the government policy on the Euro 
a target for attacks (Forster 2002: 108; Gifford 2008: 119). 
The final factor, which benefited sceptics, was the commitment of both the Labour and 
Conservative parties to hold a referendum on the issue of the single currency. It can be 
said, that this was an opportunity, which helped the Eurosceptics succeed as it gave them 
the chance to shift the issue from the political arena to a more public one, at a time when 
the abolition of sterling was warmly welcomed (Forster 2002: 108–109). 
This kind of opposition created a complex system of opponents, which had four main 
characteristics: whether they were partisan or non-partisan, anti-EMU or anti-EU. These 
groups worked not only in Parliament, but also outside it. It was a group at Oxford 
University, the so-called Young Conservatives, which worked with academics and the 
general public and started a campaign against the Maastricht Treaty and the EC. Also it 
was in the media on that Eurosceptical influence was built. As mentioned earlier, media 
outlets like The Sun, The Times and The Daily Telegraph continued to play a role in 
maintaining this trend. Both Eurosceptic positions were made up of a growing number of 
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think tanks, which provided intellectual support for opposing the single currency. The 
most notable group, which even included Mrs. Thatcher, was formed “… to provide 
informed but partisan criticism of government policy” (Forster 2002: 109 – 112; Gifford 
2008: 120, 122, 125–126). 
The oppositional arguments against the Economic and Monetary Union had a complex 
structure but were fundamentally the same. They simply had a different nature, both 
economically and politically. Among the most popular economic arguments was a belief 
that the EC/EU had not delivered the economic benefits, which it had claimed, and that 
the single currency was also not as profitable as expected. Sceptics also believed that the 
stages of accepting the Euro would not be achieved on time and that the convergence 
criteria were flawed. One group opposed the idea of keeping the Central Bank free from 
political interference and governments having the option of whether or not conditions 
were fulfilled whilst the other did not. Among the political arguments, Thatcher’s 
commitment to the loss of sovereignty and national identity should be mentioned. New 
predictions emerged, among which was a belief that the EMU would lead to the creation 
of the Political Union. In this union, independent policies of welfare improvement, 
employment and wealth creation, would exist (Baimbridge, Burkitt and Whyman 1999: 
86–87; Forster 2002: 114–117; Gifford: 133). 
Fundamentally, the issue of the single currency and the EMU united sceptics who had 
different views and divided it only into two groups: those who were strictly against EU-
membership and the Euro, and those who supported pro-membership, but oppose 
currency.  
 
3.3. John Major’s government 
John Major was elected in 1990 as the leader of the Conservative party and the man to 
resolve the crisis created by Thatcherism. This crisis was “evidenced by an economic 
recession, growing electoral unpopularity for the Conservatives and the unease within a 
party over European integration” (Gifford 2008: 111). A key feature of his 
administration was a commitment to protect and improve public service provision and 
this accounted for increases in public taxes. Some of his ministers, for example Patten 
and Willets, tried to present the modern conservative attitude as a combination of 
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Thatcher’s free trade radicalism and a belief in community, which was rooted in the long 
tradition of conservative state building (ibid: 111). 
His main political slogan appealing to European integration was based on the idea of 
placing Britain at the “heart of Europe”. A key feature of this approach was to rebuild 
relations and secure alliances with the European governing elite and governments, which 
had been alienated by Mrs. Thatcher.  His advisors and Foreign Secretary actively used 
the strategy that was built on the idea to place British Conservatives in the mainstream of 
European politics. They made close contacts with German political parties, such as the 
Christian Democrats, and also with parties in the European parliament. Major believed 
that close cooperation with Germany would stop French attempts to create a monetary 
union. Major's economic strategy was based on continued membership of the ERM, the 
goal of which was to attempt to revise the Thatcher settlement (Forster 1998: 352, 357; 
Smith 1992: 155). 
Moreover, J. Major routinely met with sceptical MPs to briefly inform them on 
developments and the major stumbling blocks, and to outline the government’s position 
on the key issues. He frequently reassured them personally that he would not sign the 
treaty, which would undermine national sovereignty. Furthermore, the Prime Minister 
tried to win over the most critical politicians with the promise of posts in his government. 
Shortly after his personal approach and his policy designed to achieve the compromise 
failed, he gave the government seats to some Eurosceptics and bound them by the 
associated responsibility (Forster 2002: 97). 
However, the ideological dominance of Thatcherism left little room for a creative 
political agenda. Gifford argues that this increasingly crystallized once “the Major 
government became preoccupied with party unity and abandoned attempts to construct 
an intellectual coherent project along the lines Patten and others had envisaged” 
(Gifford: 112). As mentioned earlier, opposition against the government's European 
policy strengthened and created a complex network of arguments and players, which 
effectively put Major’s position under increasing pressure and proved to be a disaster that 
created a divide among the Conservatives, ultimately destroying the credibility of the 
government. 
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The debate surrounding the EMU forced Major’s members of the Cabinet to resist 
negative goals and objectives such as the acceptance of the single currency, common 
foreign and security policy and common social policy. Despite Patten and his assistants 
wanting Britain to be a part of an extensive European Policy, British politics prevented 
the country from going in that direction.  Major’s government underestimated the role of 
the ERM in the state economy and opted out. These opt outs enabled the Prime Minister 
to avoid the political ramifications of the EMU and the Social Chapter without having to 
veto the whole Maastricht Treaty (Gifford 2008: 117; Forster 1998: 361–363). 
Nevertheless, Major’s policy on Anglo-American relations was strongly supported by 
different party blocks. The clearest evidence of this partnership and the support of 
American global power was the extent of British support for the First Gulf War. This war 
was welcomed as a re-emergence of Anglo-Saxon relations, which were characterised by 
seeking to regain and reassert the status of defeated nations across the Channel (Wallace 
1991: 30). 
Major’s position on Europe was ambiguous because his main objective was to unite the 
party and represent both the right and the left. He reflected the policy at the heart of 
Europe, sometimes compromising it with a Eurosceptical position. The adoption of an 
obstructivist, neo-Thatcherite approach to the EC, later to become the EU, left the 
government marginalized and damaged. After the withdrawal from the ERM, John Major 
adopted a new position, which claimed that the steps being taken by the French were 
wrong and that Europe was exactly what Thatcher said it was in her Bruges speech – 
different nation states united by active cooperation and a free trade base (Gifford 2008: 
135). 
To summarise, John Major was trying to create his own policy which was akin to 
European policy, but the fragmentation of the party and the strong voice of Eurosceptics, 
including supporters of Thatcher and other units, undermined his government and made 
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4. Labour government: Anglo-Europe and Euroscepticism 
In 1997 the Conservative party comprehensively lost the election and ceded control of 
the UK political arena to the Labour Party. Its leader Tony Blair came to power with a 
programme committed not only to fundamental constitutional change in the UK but also 
to the institutions of transnational governance. The Labour Party spelled out its policy as 
a co-operative pro-European policy, which placed “social Europe” at the centre of a 
modernised platform (Gifford 2008: 139). Blair's leadership, along with that of his 
successor Gordon Brown, emphasised “the promotion of labour market flexibility and 
economic reform in order to ensure the competitiveness of the European economy in an 
era of globalisation” (Fella 2006: 388). Through this policy they wanted to promote 
strong European political structures, which would ensure that corporations and 
transnational companies could not cause damage to the common man. They sought to 
prevent Europe and its small entrepreneurs from becoming global commercial forces 
(ibid: 392). 
The major domestic task regarding the EU was to put Britain back into the center of the 
European debate. However, foreign policy had not played a big role in the Labour 
campaign and its key idea was that “[i]t shall be a government, too, that gives this 
country strength and confidence in leadership both at home and abroad, particularly in 
respect of Europe”.12 
Both Blair and Brown tried to change public attitude towards the European Union. They 
decided to use the discourse method and challenged British “otherness”, which was based 
on a number of factors, such as history and geography, wars, and its electoral and 
parliamentary system etc. Both Prime Ministers were well aware of the national story 
they were attempting to rewrite (Daddow 2011: 133 –134). 
However, Blair’s and later Brown’s policy did not succeed in changing general British 
attitudes towards the EU. The general public, academics and politicians in all parties 
(even in Labour) remained sceptical about some of the implementations of the new 
European Union’s agreements. It replaced British exceptionalism in terms of political 
economy and political identity and actively pursued an Anglo-European project that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Blair, Tony (1997). Blair's speech at 10 Downing Street. CNN. 2.05.1997 [cit. 03.04.2014]. Available from 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/02/blair.speech/. 
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attempted to move the direction of the European Union in a British direction rather than 
vice versa (Gifford 2008: 139). 
The first subchapter describes the Labour party's attempt to reassert the policy of 
Europeanism in its government as well as giving explanations about how they decided to 
approach the achievement of this goal and what the results were. In the second part of 
this chapter, readers can find criticisms of Blair and Brown’s governments and the true 
effect of Labour policy on society. 
 
4.1. Labour Party’s attempt to reassert Anglo-Europeanism 
The Labour Party, after taking office in 1997, challenged the British way of thinking 
about Europe. Thatcher and later Brown created a strong division of European sceptics in 
political arena, public and academic spectrum. The Blair government attempted to 
undermine Franco-German dominance and construct an Anglo-conservative leadership 
based on security and economic de-regulation. Such economic strategy was built on 
widespread public ownership and heavy state intervention, in which EU membership 
would no longer be an obstacle to the implementation of party policy. This was visible 
from New Labour's attempts to create coalitions with right wing governments and 
conservative leaders such as Berlusconi and Aznar. In addition, the strategy of building 
coalitions both in the East and West with a principled opposition to deeper integration it 
was warmly welcomed. Blair thought that the European Union should concentrate on 
questions such as economic policy, immigration and environment, rather than creating 
strong governmental bodies. Curiously, by taking this position, he was actually very 
close to Major’s attempt to see Britain in Europe on economic matters, but not as a threat 
to national sovereignty. For example, the Labour government resisted making the 
European Chapter of Fundamental Rights legally binding for the UK much to the 
frustration of the British trade union movement as British workers would then be 
excluded from its social and employment rights (Daddow 2011: 1; Fella 2006: 391, 395; 
Gifford 2008: 139–140). 
One of Blair’s immediate concerns before he took office, as regards EU policy, was the 
immediacy of a further IGC to review the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. His 
advisors and party politicians created a programme, which was called The Future of the 
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European Union, and agreed that there was a need to bolster the EU’s social democratic 
content, to significantly extend the European Parliament, and to support strong social 
dimension and economic coordination in order to create employment and a European 
Recovery Fund for better distribution of the wealth created by a single market. However, 
after Blair came to power, this strategy changed. The emphasis of Labour’s EU policy 
switched from promoting employment rights to avoiding costs to businesses and 
maximizing the flexibility of the labour market (Fella 2006: 392–393). 
The New Labour government created a strategy, which they thought would well work 
even with the level of Euroscepticism in Britain. In language terms, they tried to achieve 
a theory of ‘norm entrepreneurship’. Wodak and a collection of other authors describes 
this theory as discourse, which would change “social actors constitute knowledge, 
situations, social role as well as identities and interpersonal relations between various 
interacting social groups and those who interact with them” (De Cillia, Reisigl and 
Wodak 1999: 157). Blair and Brown were well aware, or were made well aware by their 
advisors, of this discourse and used it as a weapon against the sceptics. They identified 
that British people were being kept in a permanent state of discursive war with the 
continent, in which the Eurosceptical position limited people’s thoughts and actions 
towards Europe (Daddow 2001: 65). The first step was “to reframe Britain’s debates 
about Europe and the EU through a systematic revisioning of the language, imagery and 
points of historical references around which Britain’s Europe debates occurred in the 
political, public and media worlds” (ibid: 67). Also it was necessary to create an 
organizational platform on which to build a consensus about new norms. Blair and 
Brown used existing NGOs, and made speeches at universities, business organizations, 
think tanks and institutions of the EU to spread their messages. However, Labour 
politicians did not deliver upon their strategy of discourse. This defeat was determined by 
influential political leaders such as M. Thatcher, who did not give up and continued to 
fight against active European policies, but also by critical media, which delivered their 
Eurosceptical message to a huge number of readers (ibid: 67). 
In looking at the arguments, which were used to deliver new points of view towards the 
EU at the end of the 1990s and before 9/11, economical and influential benefits and 
security framework were at the forefront. The economic benefits were named as a main 
resource of New Labour policy as regards the transformation of Britain into a Euro-
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friendly country. Both former Prime Ministers thought that through prioritized economic 
possibilities arising from British industrial openness to the European technological 
cooperation, the country would grow economically more quickly and would become 
dominant among EU countries. The government supported the EU's employment rate, 
which was created by the single market and cost 3.5 million jobs. In his speech to the 
business community, Brown also used the history of growing interconnectedness with the 
continent as an indicator of positive European influence over Britain. However, the ‘five 
tests’ of G. Brown, which will be described in the next subchapter, and the disagreement 
between Blair and Brown on the question of the single currency would not deliver the 
predicted transformation of public opinion (Daddow 2011: 91–95). 
Labour’s discourse on the question of British influence in Europe had three main points. 
The first is that Britain would be affected by developments in Europe whether the state is 
in or out of the EU. Secondly, they believed that it would make it easier for Britain to 
reform the EU from the centre of the community rather than from the periphery. Finally, 
Blair thought that Britain would be in a much stronger position to take its global 
leadership role from an EU platform, than if they stayed outside such a potentially 
powerful block (Daddow 2011: 97; Williams 2009: 233–235). 
The question about the European security framework was fundamental for British New 
Labour until 9/11. Blair represented the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
later to develop into the EC and then the EU, as a clear way forward for countries with a 
totalitarian and central planning past, a promoter of democracy and a servant of good 
values in the wider world. He declared that this structure prevented wars between old 
rivals and created an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. However, after 9/11, the 
Labour Party changed its stance and the free movement of people and goods and services 
was seen as a potential threat to national security, because of the EU's inability to act 
quickly and effectively (Daddow 2011: 103–106). 
There are three factors in Blair’s European success, which managed to locate Britain at 
the centre of (or at least very close to) decision-making in the EU. At first, he tried to 
normalize relations with the EU during the Amsterdam IGC of 1997 and started to 
promote successful European defence initiatives. However, public opinion and that of 
MPs limited Blair’s attitude toward the single currency, so to draw up a simple balance 
sheet was extremely difficult. The second argument involves looking at how the 
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government managed the potentially explosive question of Europe as a part of its national 
electoral success. They managed to win the vast majority of seats in parliament from 
1997 – 2007 and backbenchers13 were unable to restrict the government's power. Also it 
was necessary and visible in both Blair and Brown’s government that the Labour Party 
was able to neutralize the issue of Europe in its manifestos and to keep down discussion 
about European policy during election campaigns. The third and final argument, 
according to Daddow, lies in moving from a consideration of public opinion on New 
Labour to Blair’s own position in his cabinet and party. It was a success for the former 
Prime Minister personally but not politically (Daddow 2011: 14–15). 
The Labour Party was well informed about the Eurosceptic movement and actively used 
descriptions about rivals of the EU to their own advantage. Blair in his speeches 
portrayed the sceptics as ideological opponents to the principle of supranational 
integration. He saw their objective as an intellectually sound, but outdated, rejection of 
shared sovereignty and commonly accepted rules such as majority voting. The most 
sceptical of them, he suggested, wanted to withdraw from the EU itself.14 In this speech, 
Blair described Eurosceptics using Taggart-Szczerbiak’s classification and giving it a 
negative connotation. It should certainly be mentioned that the Labour Party faced a 
strong political discourse, but tried hard to break away from this. 
 
4.2 Continuous British exceptionalism 
Euroscepticism did not become the fundamental ideological issue after the defeat of the 
Conservative party in 1997. Tony Blair tried to create a modernised Labour party 
including a pro-European approach. However, long-term problems in relations with the 
European Union still remained and overshadowed the achievements of the Labour 
government (Gifford 2008: 139). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Backbencher is a Member of Parliament in the Westminster system, who does not hold governmental office. He 
serves in relative anonymity and votes when and how their leader tells them to (Malcolmson and Myers 2012: 126).	  
14  Blair, Tony (2006). Speech on Europe. Harvard.edu. [cit. 04. 04. 2014]. Available from 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic162932.files/Tony_Blair_Oxford_Speech_on_europe.htm. 
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The distinctive Labour approach towards the EU in terms of globalization had an impact 
on business, trade and the life of the people. Blair tried to accept European centrality to 
Britain’s economic interests, but did not want to fully integrate without benefits for his 
own country. However, understanding the driving forces of the UK produces a 
counterargument, which describes the British economy as a mechanism dependent on 
financial and trading activities rather than manufacturing and production. According to 
this, it seems ineffective to take the British financial system deeper into European 
legislative and control apparatus, which would restrict the flow of money and 
relationships with global capital trade (Gifford 2008: 142). 
Why did not this situation change? What were the problems of Labour policy related to 
Europe? First of all, the Labour party picked up the ‘no strategy’ view that Europe was 
mistreated by Blair and Downing Street on the one hand and Brown and the Treasury on 
the other. For Blair the top priorities were domestic issues, and the question of European 
policy was highly problematic. His personal attitude was focused on personal diplomacy 
with the US, and it was Brown’s responsibility to negotiate with the EU. Secondly, there 
was a failure of leadership on the part of the Prime Minister to hold a referendum on the 
single currency. Blair wanted to make this step but Brown and the Treasury Board 
conducted five economic tests on British membership of the single currency, which were 
an attempt to de-politicize the issue through a rule-based approach by reducing its 
electoral salience. These tests included questions about the convergence of the British 
economy with the EU, the flexibility of business and the British workforce, possible 
investment into the country’s economy, and the impact of the Eurozone on financial 
services and employment. The results of the Treasury report showed that British 
businesses and economy in general were prepared to accept the single currency, but the 
problem lay in creating a flexibility between, and sufficient convergence with, European 
economics. Thus, the absence of a referendum from Blair’s side, later ended his effective 
premiership (Daddow 2011: 29; Sowemimo 1999: 357–361). 
Challenging British “otherness” was a hot topic of the Labour government, which did not 
yield the expected results. It was an extremely difficult pill to swallow for Britons that 
their eldest rival France would become their best friend, or for them to accept that British 
geographical and historical uniqueness would become a part of European history. This 
fight was limited by media and cultural programs, which influenced society and openly 
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highlighted Euroscepticism even, for example, in the reporting of football matches by the 
press. In trying to impose a shared European vision, Blair and Brown met significant 
resistance from the British public and the wider world. New Labour’s discourses on 
leadership were representing the shift in the political landscape of Britain. However, this 
landscape did not meld with public attitudes and the mixed political messages being 
delivered highlighted the problem, which combined progressive and traditionalist takes 
on the British role in the world (Daddow 2011: 114 – 117, 127, 221). 
As regards the European political arena, there was also a problem in understanding 
British “otherness”. Member states of the EU, especially France, started to challenge the 
British agenda of making special exceptions in order to influence the European budget. 
They wanted to end the British debate, while the British agenda was to change the 
economic structure of the EU, particularly the reshaping of the CAP and the funds 
allocated to it.  Brown went further in his beliefs that economic reform in the EU needed 
to become a precondition for UK membership of the Euro. However, the majority of 
European politicians didn't have such changes in mind and therefore made it impossible 
for the British government to implement activities of this sort (Fella 2006: 389–390). 
The biggest critic of the Labour government’s European policy, Robin Cook, used a 
powerful rhetoric against Blair-Brown’s line on Europe. He suggested that the EU’s 
unpopularity lay in its apparent alignment with the negative impulses of globalization 
such as the erosion of job security and the effect on quality of life. Furthermore, the UK 
government did not help itself by blocking progressive and popular measures that would 
improve the lot of workers in both Britain and the EU. Moreover, Cook opposed the 
tendency of Blair’s government to pass nationalist rhetoric when dealing with the EU in 
order to gain cheap popularity at home. He saw those steps as extremely ineffective and 
argued that this was only “a good press game at home” (ibid: 396–397). 
Eurobarometer, an opinion poll team and journal published annually since 1973, has 
published opinion polls about different countries’ attitude to European affairs. During 
Blair’s period in office, Britain was shown as one of the most sceptical members of the 
EU and according to both regional polling and analyses, it was a pattern created many 
years ago. Openly critical attitudes towards the EU were more than twice as high in 
Britain compared with the average of the other 27 member states. This showed that, 
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despite Blair's best efforts, there was no real improvement in the relations between UK 
and European Union (Daddow 2011: 18–19). 
All of this led to a broad disillusionment with Labour policy, which finished its short, but 
successful period of popularity and support among the people and ran the risk of turning 
the public once again against the European project. The Labour Party left a big hole in 
the question of Europe and now it is the challenge of the contemporary government to 
construct the necessary legislative framework and define relations with the EU.  
 
5. Contemporary British Euroscepticism 
The contemporary British political arena, especially the groups in it, is discussing the EU 
issue on a regular basis and it is at the forefront of British contemporary politics. Media 
outlets, academics and, in some ways, the government pay a great deal of attention to the 
possible in-out referendum and the rising popularity of extremist parties. The populist, 
single issue party UKIP is now playing a big role in the public domain and defines 
changes in attitude towards the EU. The growing scepticism in parliament and the 
changing stance of the government show the impact that this political party has had. 
However, the electoral system and the lack of financial resources has hindered UKIP's 
attempts to gain seats in the House of Commons and thus directly influence Britain's 
European policy.  
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the contemporary government is 
composed of two different parties, which, as a result of their coalition, have been forced 
to change their stances. The Conservative Party seems to be a soft Eurosceptic body, the 
leader of which describes himself as a pragmatic and sensible Eurosceptic. He 
emphasized his attitude in a speech, which discussed the challenges Britain faces as 
regards Europe and appealed to the EU about the need for reforms. On the other hand, 
their partners, the Liberal Democrats, have constantly been pro-European and oppose 
discussions about reforms, especially the possibility of a referendum about membership  
(Lynch 2011: 222).15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Watt, Nicolas (2013a). David Cameron challenges Nick Clegg over EU referendum. The Guardian. 30. 06. 2013 
[cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jun/30/david-cameron-nick-clegg-eu-
referendum. 
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The British Conservative Party today is more likely to be Eurosceptical. This is directly 
related to how they see Britain’s foreign policy and its place in the world. Given their 
lack of sympathy for the EU, they are compelled to steer Britain into the American 
sphere of influence. This is why their emphasis lies in NATO as the main defence 
structure of the EU and their “special relationship” or “Atlanticism” has played too key a 
part in British diplomatic history, to the detriment of maintaining a close engagement in 
European matters. However, the US and other significant players in the world game want 
to see Britain as a part of the EU. This controversial situation appeals to the 
contemporary government and complicates its policy and attitude towards the European 
Union (Beech 2011: 353).   
In this chapter, the issue of England possibly quitting the EU is discussed, which 
according to opinion polls seems entirely possible. When discussing this issue, it is 
important to consider the circumstances which have led to the contemporary rise in 
Euroscepticism and the scenario of possible withdrawal.  
5.1 UKIP 
The United Kingdom Independence Party is a right-wing populist party, which was 
founded in 1993 as a reaction to Europe’s federalist project of creating an even closer 
political and economic union made possible by the Maastricht Treaty16. However, the 
party roots can be dated back to the Bruges speech, which led to the creation of the 
Bruges group and a highly diffused opposition to European integration. From the outset, 
the party was a part of the Anti-federalist League, but their leader, Alan Sked, and his 
small group of followers launched a new structure with new policies, a new logo and new 
aims. The main aim was “to put pressure on the British government of the day by not 
taking up any European Parliament seats it might win” (Usherwood 2010: 5–6). 
However, the party performance in the 1994 EP elections (see Appendix 4) was weak, 
because of the small amount of media coverage it had received and the small number of 
MPs joining it (ibid: 6). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 PressTV (2013). UK Independence Party & policies; an overview. 08. 05. 2013. [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available 
from http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/05/08/302487/ukip/. 
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The situation changed in 1999 (see Appendix 4), when the UK changed its electoral 
system for European parliament’s elections from first-past-the-post single member 
districts to multi-districts elected by proportional representation. UKIP won 3 seats in the 
European Parliament and their representatives joined the new Europe of Democracies 
and Diversities (EDD) group. The then leader of the party, Michael Holmes, gave a 
speech in the EP, which ended up sounding distinctly pro-integrationist. Party members 
challenged his leadership and passed a vote of no confidence in September 1999. 
However, this did not resolve the situation and disputes continued resulting in a 
weakened party at the General Elections in 2001. This comprehensive defeat was also the 
result of the European Union not being a major part of the political debate engaged in by 
other parties (Usherwood 2010: 9; PressTV 2013). 
During Labour's tenure in office, UKIP was limited by the determination of the 
government to retain its populist credentials and adapt the European issue to both British 
public opinion and contemporary European developments. Britain’s relationship with the 
EU was articulated in terms of ‘red lines’, opt outs and negative negotiating positions 
pursued in defence of the national interest. Brown attempted to assert its populism by 
appealing to British nationalism and challenging the significant problem of legitimating 
his European policy as any further engagement with the integration process focused on 
Eurosceptic mobilisation. This left no space for UKIP’s activities and until the 2009 
election party it became an outsider in the General and EP elections (Gifford 2008: 145–
146). 
The first change in party stance was seen in the 2004 EP elections (see Appendix 4), 
when the party began to contest local elections on the basic of environment and 
libertarian values. Moreover, it began to invest more effort into developing policies 
beyond EU withdrawal. This was characterised by the development of an immigration 
and asylum policy. Some leaders, such as, Clifford and Kilroy-Silk, helped to manage the 
party’s media image. The recruitment of these famous figures to UKIP aroused massive 
media interest and gave the party the image of mistrusting the metropolitan, politically-
correct elites (Usherwood 2010: 9–10). 
Nigel Farage became the party leader in 2006 and continued the party reforms. He gained 
even more success in the 2009 EP election (see Appendix 4), when the party won 13 
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seats and came second to the Conservatives in terms of votes won.17 The new MEPs have 
teamed up with other Eurosceptics and formed a strong group in the European Parliament 
entitled the Europe of Freedom and Democracy, which is calling for withdrawal from the 
EU.18 
In a little over a month the European Parliament’s elections will be held. For the purpose 
of this election, UKIP has published two versions of its Manifesto 2014, which represents 
the party’s electoral campaign both for the EP and local elections. Most notably among 
the concerns of their home affairs’ document are immigration, which they claim is out of 
control, environment, planning, housing, public health and social care, security and 
crime, and unemployment. Considering those points, it can be implied that UKIP’s 
program appeals to “common sense policies, which will make people’s lives easier and 
the government will do what is needed, but no more”.19 Their main priorities are to bring 
power back to the people through binding local referendums when people demand them, 
and also to government closer to the people in means of enterprise, attracting jobs and 
regenerating town centres. UKIP believes that their party could use the money given to 
EU to rebuild the debt-ridden British economy.20 
Their European program, also called Manifesto 2014, has a slightly different nature. In 
this document, the main emphasis lies in the prediction that if voters choose UKIP, the 
party would actively and effectively negotiate an immediate withdrawal from the EU. 
Their arguments challenge the policies and arguments of traditional and influential 
British parties21 who have stated that UK withdrawal from the EU will cost Britain too 
much. The manifesto calls for a re-imagination of the real economic and trade situation 
with the EU, which only damages Britain and takes jobs and money from the state. UKIP 
also argues that the fuel and energy economic sector of Britain is under threat from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 PressTV (2013). UK Independence Party & policies; an overview. 08. 05. 2013. [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available 
from http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/05/08/302487/ukip/. 
18  BBC (2009). UKIP forms new Eurosceptic group. 01. 07. 2009 [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8129312.stm. 
19 UKIP (2014b). Manifesto 2014: Open-door immigration is crippling local services in the UK [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. 
Available from http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5308a93901925b5b09000002/attachments/original/ 
1397750311/localmanifesto2014.pdf?1397750311, p. 2–4, 9. 
20 Ibid, p. 8. 
21 Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Labour Party 
	   34	  
European laws and restrictions. According to this document, independence will bring 
many positive effects and make the country wealthier and stronger both economically 
and nationally.22  
The European Parliament elections in May 2014 may define the future of the party. A 
YouGov opinion poll (see Appendix 5), however, has predicted that the support of UKIP 
will grow enormously and that the party will win second place in elections, substantially 
damaging the Conservatives and LibDems. This change shows a public concern about the 
European Union, which has not delivered upon the predicted potential economic growth. 
People want to have jobs, high wages and new houses whilst also taking social benefits 
from the state in the form of better free education and health care. However, EU bodies 
and UK governing parties could not deliver these goods for people. In such situations, 
voters turn to populist parties, which sometimes appear more effective than traditional 
ones.23    
Unfortunately, the party’s biggest weakness is their failure to secure a geographical base 
from which they might take seats in the Commons. Their traditional strength has its 
foundations in the South-West, driven by fishermen, farmers and the elderly, but the 
party has not been focused enough, and in the case of a tightly focused campaign, not 
enough money would be brought back. In addition, there is a continuing problem relating 
to policy, which they cannot deliver without set mechanisms. The party is still in the 
process of creating these mechanisms, so their program is seen as an ideological, rather 
than a genuine one (Usherwood 2010: 15).  
The United Kingdom Independence Party demonstrates the uniqueness of the British 
party system in that it has been created and is based on a single issue – withdrawal from 
the EU. The first-past-the-post system will not bring UKIP to power and severely 
restricts its abilities in the domestic political arena. However, the European Parliament’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  UKIP (2014a). Manifesto 2014: Create an earthquake [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from 
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5308a93901925b5b09000002/attachments/original/1398167812/Euro
ManifestoMarch.pdf?1398167812. 
23 Kellner, Peter (2014). European elections: UKIP closes in on first place. University of Cambridge. 16. 01. 2014 
[cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from http://cambridge.yougov.com/news/2014/01/16/european-elections-ukip-closes-
first-place/. 	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proportional system gives space for UKIP to influence British opinion on the European 
Union and to challenge the traditional parties' policies. The growing popularity of this 
party demonstrates the strong dislike of the EU among the British public and predicts a 
negative result in the membership referendum, if one were to be arranged. 
 
5.2 Cameron-Clegg’s government 
The contemporary government was formed in 2010 after the General Election, in which 
the Conservative Party won first place with more than 35%, which was not enough to 
take control of the House of Commons in a majority. The third party with 23% was the 
Liberal Democrats, who agreed to form a coalition government with the Conservatives. 
The hottest question facing the Coalition was to create a united vision regarding the 
European Union. Therefore, to encourage better governance, a leadership discussion 
began and a common manifesto was created, in which both parties tempered their 
enthusiasm and reached common ground to allow them to lead the government (Lynch 
2011: 218, 221). 
The Conservative party, especially its leader David Cameron, gave a pledge to a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. If Lisbon had not been ratified by all Member 
States when the Conservatives entered office, they would have withdrawn their 
ratification, held a referendum on the treaty and led the campaign for a ‘No’ vote. On the 
subject of ratification, the Conservatives promised to change this policy. It was a promise 
for action in the domestic arena and in the EU to prevent the further strengthening of the 
Union and address concerns about Lisbon. Their agenda was directed to a referendum 
lock, a full opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and greater protection 
against EU invasion into the UK’s criminal justice system. The party believed that the 
exemptions negotiated by Labour were insufficient, and the repatriation of social and 
employment policy has been a long-standing demand of the Conservatives (Charter 2012: 
70–71; Lynch 2011: 219–220). 
On the other hand, the Liberal Democrats had a different view and agenda towards the 
EU, because they saw themselves as a much more pro-European party. The party 
believed that it was in Britain’s long-term interest to join the single currency, subject to 
approval in a referendum. In the final leadership debate about the economic situation in 
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Greece, Clegg denied that the LibDems advocated entry to the Euro. However, they 
committed themselves to a 2005 manifesto related to an “in-out” referendum the next 
time Britain negotiates its relationship with the EU. This stance has changed since the 
Lisbon Treaty, when the party lacked consistency and argued that a referendum is not 
required (Lynch 2011: 220). 
In victory, however, both parties required repatriation pledges during the negotiations 
which would help to create a single policy towards the EU. The Coalition Programme for 
Government developed the right balance between constructive engagement with the EU 
to deal with issues, which are affecting the society and national sovereignty and the 
familiar stance that Britain should play a leading role in an enlarged Union (Charter 
2012: 71). 
The Coalition program rules out participation in a European Public Prosecutor system, 
but other legislation on criminal justice would be based on a case-by-case basis with a 
view to maximizing the country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and 
preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system. This program in general is not 
different from recent governments, as it still wants to play the role of defender of national 
interest, supporter of the Single Market and further enlargement, and interrogator of the 
reform of CAP and EU budget. It also wants to discuss EU social policy, criminal justice 
and defence proposals (Lynch 2011: 221). 
In looking at the hottest questions about new policy changes, which were brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
as a diplomatic service of the EU, should be discussed. The Conservatives had opposed 
the creation of the EEAS but now accepted it as a fact. The contemporary government 
wants to shape the development of this structure, and therefore respects the competence 
of EU member states in constructing foreign policy and works in cooperation with their 
diplomatic services. However it continues to provide a strong voice in areas where the 
EU has an agreed common position. For example, Cameron’s support for Turkish 
membership in the EU shows the opposition to the common view of other EU members, 
which is against the country’s acceptance. In terms of justice and home affairs, the 
Coalition government joined the EU Directive on the European Investigation Order, 
which they believe would help to fight cross-border crime and would make evidence 
collected when investigating a crime more visible. Furthermore, the new government has 
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signed other EU directives connected to restricting the movement between member states 
of terrorist finance and the sexual exploitation of children. However, some directives 
were not accepted because the government claimed that they were already included in the 
British criminal and judicial system and therefore it was not necessary to review them 
(Lynch 2011: 223 – 224). 
While the British government is influential during European state discussions, the real 
power is in the hands of EU governmental bodies and other states. The clearest example 
of British insolvency is the adoption of Fiscal Compact. Cameron and his political 
proponents used a veto to stop this document becoming a part of the EU treaty, the main 
financial service legislation, but ultimately this attempt failed. Cameron refused to accede 
to Fiscal Compact, which he stated was against British national interests. In June 2012, 
almost a hundred Conservative MPs wrote a letter to the Prime Minister with an appeal to 
give a clear legal commitment to holding a referendum before 2015 (Charter 2012: 75–
76). 
It is important to analyze D. Cameron’s speech on membership in the EU, which has 
opened a debate about possibly quitting and started a countrywide agenda for withdrawal. 
In this pronouncement he set out an agenda for EU reform and if those reforms do not 
start, the British government will be supportive of a withdrawal. In his speech, the Prime 
Minister mentioned three current challenges presented by the EU. Firstly, there are 
problems in the Eurozone, which are driving fundamental changes in the EU. Countries 
who currently use the Euro have challenged the crisis of the new currency and created a 
strong policy, which would help to fix it. However, countries outside the Eurozone, such 
as Britain, feel that this policy does not protect their interests and require certain 
safeguards to ensure that their access to funds or the single market is not compromised 
(Cameron 2013: 89, 92). 
Secondly, there is a crisis related to European competitiveness with the rest of the global 
market as its world output is projected to fall by almost a third in the next two decades. 
Complex rules restricting the labour markets, brought about by this prediction, are not 
occurring as a natural phenomenon. Therefore, this presents the huge challenge for 
European leaders to overcome; the creation of a market, which will work for prosperity 
(ibid: 89). 
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Finally, there is a “gap between the EU and its citizens, which has grown dramatically in 
recent years. And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent that 
is … felt particularly acutely in Britain” (ibid: 89). People are frustrated that decisions 
taken at the EU level are away from everyday concerns such as living standards or taxes. 
This disagreement can be seen during the mass demonstrations and strikes against some 
reforms produced by the EU (ibid: 89). 
However, Cameron said that he personally believes that the EU is a good thing, which 
will be more effective for people after reforms based on five key principles. The first 
principle is competitiveness, which will be based on a single market which must become 
less bureaucratic, helping its members to compete. The second principle concerns 
flexibility, which would respect the diversity of member countries (Cameron 2013: 89–
90). It should be “a flexible union of free member states who share treaties and 
institutions and pursue together the ideal of co-operation” (ibid 2013: 90). The third 
guideline is that power must be in the hands of each individual national government, and 
thus shared sovereignty is the wrong principle for cooperation. A united structure, he 
claims, cannot unite different countries with different priorities and cultures. The fourth 
principle is democratic accountability, which will allow national parliaments to play a 
more significant role. It will be their priority to look after the interests of their own 
country and do business between themselves. Finally, the fifth principle for reform is 
fairness. The EU should create the kind of policies, which do not punish some of its 
members and therefore do not spread discord (ibid: 90–91). 
This speech was welcomed by soft Eurosceptics in Britain and in some way draws 
parallels with Margaret Thatcher’s speech in Bruges. By introducing his promise to hold 
a referendum, he energized the UKIP and Conservative hard Eurosceptics, yet challenged 
cabinet members, who are pro-European to whom commitment to the referendum 
appears as a threat to them.24 His commitment activated the agenda for a referendum 
about membership, which is now going to be discussed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Watt, Nicolas (2013a). David Cameron challenges Nick Clegg over EU referendum. The Guardian. 30. 06. 2013 
[cit. 10. 04. 2014]. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jun/30/david-cameron-nick-clegg-eu-
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5.3       To stay or leave? Referendum about membership of the 
EU 
Anti-EU feelings have appeared in Britain ever since the emergence of the Union. When 
considering the previous chapters, it is apparent that Euroscepticism has a long history in 
Britain and appears to focus on the protection of British national interests. However, 
since the 1980s this phenomenon has been steadily gaining public popularity, because of 
new technologies and the speed of the spread of information. The media began to use it 
as a strong device against the government and its British policy toward Europe by 
appealing to British “otherness” and the insolvency of the EU when trying to deliver 
goods to people. 
It must be stated that these concerns are true, and this is a challenge for British leaders to 
either change European policy or to opt out of the EU. However, there has been a general 
trend of dramatic decline in British recruitment to European institutions. While the UK 
makes up 13 per cent of the European population, it has just 5 per cent of the jobs in the 
European Commission and merely 2 per cent at entry level. Therefore, to protect British 
interests in all areas of the EU is extremely difficult for a government with a small 
number of British European researchers (Charter 2012: 67).  
Another problem related to the advancement of British interests is Cameron’s withdrawal 
in 2005 from the most influential group of in the EP, called the European People’s Party, 
and the establishment of a new group, the European Conservatives and Reformists, with 
only right-wing Czech and Polish parties and misfits from Latvia, Lithuania and 
Hungary. This step left the Conservative party in the margins of decision-making and left 
no space for lobbying British interests on the biggest European platform (Charter 2012: 
68–69). 
As previously discussed, Cameron, in his first speech of 2013, promised a referendum 
about membership in the EU for British people by 2017 at the earliest. His commitment 
was based on “a cool head analysis” and, most importantly, on an attempt to reform 
union policy towards a better free market rather than a political union. Cameron's most 
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likely stance would be to take Britain outside EU matters leading to the return of some 
power to the nation state, whilst not completely leaving the Union.25  
However, the party’s back benchers, who are strongly Eurosceptical, have begun to 
challenge this idea. The first legal proposal was made by Tory back bencher Adam 
Afriyie, who tried to call a referendum in 2014. The Commons voted against this 
proposal, and the Conservative leadership expressed the concern that a referendum 
should only be held after attempts to renegotiate Britain’s relations with the EU, which 
could take several years.26 
Subsequently, in March 2014, in a reaction to a YouGov opinion poll about preferences 
in the EP elections and the suggested defeat of the Conservatives, the British Prime 
Minister set out a new agenda for Europe and Britain’s membership, presenting its results 
to the country in a straight in-out referendum. He made a seven-point plan about Britain's 
key priorities, which include: the return of power to national governments; the ability of 
national parliaments to work together to block unwanted European legislation; the 
openness of the EU market to greater free trade with North America and Asia; the 
returning of protection and justice policy to the UK systems, unencumbered by 
unnecessary interference from European institutions; the free movement to take up work, 
not free benefits; support for the continued enlargement of the EU with a new mechanism 
for the prevention of mass immigration; the termination of the concept of an “ever closer 
union” for Britain. Through these steps Cameron expresses his support and shares 
people’s concerns about the EU. This ambitious agenda, he claims, would change British 
relations with the European Union.27 
Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democracts oppose Cameron’s idea about the 
referendum. According to Ed Miliband, the current Labour leader, this commitment 
would jeopardize international relations and trade and would damage the British image in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Mason, Rowena (2013b). UK not ready for EU referendum, says David Cameron. The Guardian. 10. 10. 2013 
[cit. 11. 04. 2014]. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/eu-referendum-david-cameron. 
26 Mason, Rowena (2013a). MPs reject early EU referendum. The Guardian. 22. 10. 2013 [cit. 11. 04. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/ 22/mps-rejects-early-europe-referendum. 
27 The Guardian (2014a). David Cameron sets out agenda for EU reform. 16. 03. 2014 [cit. 11. 04. 2014]. Available 
from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/david-cameron-eu-reform. 
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Europe.28 However, this party has voted in favour of a parliamentary bill that would pave 
the way for a referendum on Britain’s EU membership by 2017. 29  The Liberal 
Democrats, the second part of the coalition government, do not have a great deal of 
confidence in this step. Nick Clegg, the LibDem leader, believes that Cameron’s plans to 
renegotiate British relations with the EU are condemned to failure. He declared that pro-
Europeans were always best placed to reform the Union and that the Conservative 
proposal would never achieve this goal and thus would never satisfy hard-line 
Eurosceptics.30 
Currently all attention is being focused on the central question of this thesis – the 
possibility of the UK eventually leaving the EU. The public is split down the middle 
about what the UK should do: leave the EU or stay. According to YouGov opinion polls 
(see Appendix 6) the general public’s opinion is divided between those who want to 
remain in the EU (nearly 40 per cent) and those who want to leave it (nearly 40 per cent) 
over the last year. After Cameron’s speech in 2013, support for an exit grew, but in the 
months leading up to the EP elections and with the establishment of a new agenda of 
reforming the European polls led to reduced this support. However, remaining in the EU 
would be warmly welcomed if Cameron can change relations with the Union, leading to 
a greater protection of British interests. In this case, the support rises more to over 50 per 
cent and exit is welcomed by only 20 per cent. Around half of the public feel there would 
be no difference in British influence around the world and no difference between how the 
people live regardless of whether EU membership is maintained or it decides to stand 
alone.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The Guardian (2014b). Europe: ins and outs of a Labour dilemma. 12. 03. 2014 [cit. 11. 04. 2014]. Available 
from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/12/europe-ins-and-outs-labour-dilemma-referendum-
editorial. 
29 Watt, Nicolas (2013b). Labour refuses to rule out EU referendum. The Guardian. 05. 07. 2013 [cit. 11.04.2014]. 
Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/05/labour-refuses-rule-out-eu-referendum. 
30 Watt, Nicolas (2014). PM’s strategy on UK’s EU membership condemned to fail - Clegg. The Guardian. 05. 03. 
2014 [cit. 11.04.2014]. Available from http://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/mar/05/cameron-renegotiate-uk-
eu-membership-fail-clegg.  
31 YouGov (2014). EU referendum [cit. 11. 04. 2014]. Available from http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumu 
lus_uploads/document/dzxvvpa5om/YG-Archives-Pol-Trackers-Europe-Referendum-220414.pdf. 
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When considering these numbers there appears to be a general public trend in favour of 
leaving the EU. However, it is in hands of the contemporary government and European 
politicians to change this trend and to dispel British disillusionment about the Union. If 
David Cameron wins the next general election and does not provide the promised 
implementations, Euroscepticism would still be high and there is a strong possibility of 
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6. Conclusion 	  
The aim of this bachelor thesis was to analyze British relations with the European Union 
over the last three decades, especially as regards the Eurosсepticism within those 
governments. The explanatory case method was used to effectively describe the growth, 
popularity and influence of British Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the thesis has answered 
the question about the reasons for the rise of the studied phenomenon and provided useful 
explanations and reasons for each point discussed. 
The main question relates to a possible British referendum on EU membership and a 
potential withdrawal in the future. Firstly, it was necessary to gather the relevant 
resources to address the theoretical discussion including the differing descriptions of 
Euroscepticism proposed by different authors. It was then necessary to choose one 
appropriate definition and apply it to the various British governments. In addition, it was 
necessary to focus on the last three decades, because the active growth and new image of 
Euroscepticism began in 1988 after Thatcher’s Bruges speech before gaining momentum 
thanks to historical developments and the inability of former leaders to successfully 
challenge the EU issue.  
The most affected government, according to this analysis, was the government of John 
Major, which challenged the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and met with the strong 
opposition of Eurosceptics, who wanted the UK to withdraw from the European Union. 
Later, in 1997, he seemed to become a “lame duck”32, and his successor Tony Blair was 
trying to go against the grain by attempting to reassert EU-UK relations. Indeed, this 
became a key policy of the successive Labour governments led by Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown. Blair inherited a country that had benefited economically from the 
European’s Union single market but was intensively wary of other forms of integration. 
He wanted to establish a closer relationship with Europe, but was unable to do this 
because of strong opposition from the general public and other members of the political 
arena, who found its values to be unacceptable. He inevitably struggled against the 
British feeling of “otherness” from Europe in a world of superpowers and multinational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “Lame duck” – in politics this term means an elected official who is approaching the end of his tenure, especially 
one whose successor has already been elected (The Free Dictionary 2014). 
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blocks. Blair did not manage to place Britain at the heart of Europe and his belief in 
accepting the Euro as a single currency and accepting a new constitution failed (Charter 
2012: 46–47).  
In this thesis some facts were discovered about former British political leaders and most 
of the influential groups in the UK parliament were defined. For example, the Bruges 
Group is still an active Eurosceptical voice and it has been generated a number of 
different political figures, who are now engaged in challenging the Coalition 
government's stance on the European issue. The thesis then devotes a chapter to one of 
the most popular Eurosceptic and populist party which emerged from the Bruges Group – 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). It is important to understand the policy 
of this party, which is rapidly gaining popularity and influence over the contemporary 
government by introducing hard Euroscepticism. 
The title of this thesis and its introduction created research questions which it has 
attempted to answer. As regards the question about the increasing rise of Euroscepticism, 
the thesis analyses the most recent governmental attempts to negotiate with the EC/EU 
and describes the main Eurosceptical concerns and how its influence has grown using the 
single-case study method. It must be noted that every government has tried to overcome 
problems connected with the intergovernmental structure, but those attempts were 
ultimately unsuccessful, sometimes leading to the comprehensive defeat of the party 
during the General Elections.  
The main goal of this thesis was to provide an answer for the question about whether the 
UK will eventually withdraw from the EU. Thanks to quantitative research based on 
opinion polls this goal was successfully achieved. The tendency of the British public to 
treasure its "otherness" leads to the conclusion that Britain is more likely to withdraw 
from the Union than to stay in it. However, this research also finds one more possible 
solution which would consolidate the UK’s membership in the EU. The general public 
believes that if Prime Minister Cameron is able to defend British national interests in the 
European political arena and create a reform, which would be adopted by the European 
governmental bodies, they would vote for staying in Europe. 
Britain and Brussels are now actively going in opposite directions. The prospect of a new 
EU treaty would end the uncertain British relationship with the EU. It remains to be seen 
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how effective Cameron will be on the European political scene and if he will win a 
second term of office for his party in the 2015 General Election (Charter 2012: 79). 
A further comparative study about UK-EU relations could be created based on this 
research. It would be interesting to analyse and compare the same facts after a set period 
of time, specifically after the year 2017, when a referendum on membership is predicted 
to happen.  
Subsequently, it would be possible for the Prime Minister at that time to develop the 
basis of the next British policy regarding the EU by learning from the mistakes made by 
his predecessor. 	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8. Abstract 
The subject of this bachelor thesis is the Analysis of British relations with the European 
Union during the last three decades. The main question posed by this work concerns 
whether Britain is becoming increasingly Eurosceptical and if it will eventually pull out 
of the Union. 
The first part explains the key terms and gives general information about the 
phenomenon, and moreover discusses the British version of Euroscepticism in scientific 
terms. The practical part of the work considers different government attitudes towards the 
EU and tries to pinpoint the reason for the increasing popularity of Euroscepticism over 
the last three decades. The Conservative policy toward the end of the 1980s and at the 
beginning of the 1990s is described here as a main resource used by contemporary 
Eurosceptics. However, Labour's attempt to reassert a more pro-European policy is 
included and the failure of this policy is discussed.  
The main goal of this thesis is to provide analysis of Britain's contemporary policy 
towards the EU, discover how this phenomenon has developed and become so popular 
today, and of course discuss the possible results of a membership referendum if one is 
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9. Resumé 
Tématem této bakalářské práce je „Analýza britských vztahů s Evropskou unií během 
posledních tří desetiletí“, kde centrální otázkou je, jestli se Velká Británie stává stále více 
euroskeptickou a zda  nakonec vystoupí z Evropské unie.  
První část práce vysvětluje základní pojmy a přináší obecné informace o zkoumaném 
jevu, kromě toho se zabývá britskou verzí euroskepticismu s ohledem na vědeckou teorii. 
Praktická část práce se dívá na postoj různých vlád vůči Evropské unii a snaží se 
definovat popularitu euroskeptického směru v průběhu posledních tří desetiletí. 
Konzervativní strana, vládnoucí koncem osmdesátých a začátkem devadesátých let, je v 
práci považovaná za hlavní zdroj současného euroskepticismu. Součásti této práce je taky  
příslib Labouristické strany o směřování Británie k více pro-evropské politice, který 
nebyl nakonec splněn a tento neúspěch je argumentován.  
Hlavním cílem  práce je poskytnout analýzu současné britské politiky vůči EU, zjistit, jak 
soudobý euroskepticismus vznikl, a co vedlo k jeho popularitě, a samozřejmě nastínit 
možné výsledky referenda o členství v EU, pokud takový krok nastane. 
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10. Appendices  
 
Appendix 1. The development of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
 
 




Appendix 2. Structure (pillars) of Maastricht Treaty 
	  
Resource: Schumann, Wolfgang 2014.  
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Appendix 4. UKIP’s Electoral preferences 
Election Percent of Vote  Number of Seats 
1997 General Election 0.3 (105, 722) 0 
1999 EP Election 6.9 (696, 057) 3 
2001 General Election 1.5 (390, 563) 0 
2004 EP Election 16.1 (2, 660, 768) 12 
2005 General Election 2.2 (603, 298) 0 
2009 EP Election 16.5 (2, 498, 226) 13 
Resource: White, Michael 2013. 
 
Appendix 5. YouGov opinion poll about EP 2014 elections 
 
Resourse: Kellner, Peter 2014. 
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Appendix 6. YouGov opinion polls about EU referendum 
If there was a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, how 
would you vote? 
 
Remain in 
EU Leave EU 
Wouldn't 
vote Don't know 
2014 % % % % 
April 3-4 42 37 5 16 
March 27-28 42 36 5 16 
March 23-24 42 36 5 17 
March 9-10 41 39 5 15 
February 9-10 36 39 7 18 
January 12-13 33 43 5 19 
2013     
December 1-9 37 43 4 16 
November 10-11 39 39 5 17 
October 13-14 37 42 5 15 
September 15-16 39 42 4 16 
August 18-19 34 46 5 15 
August 4-5 35 43 5 17 
July 22-23 35 45 6 15 
July 7-8 36 43 5 16 
June 23-24 31 45 6 18 
June 9-10 35 43 5 17 
May 28-29 35 43 5 17 
May 12-13 34 44 4 17 
May 9-10 30 47 4 19 
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May 7 35 46 4 16 
April 21-22 35 43 5 17 
April 7-8 36 43 7 14 
March 25-26 33 44 5 19 
February 17-18 38 41 5 15 
January 24-25 37 39 5 19 
January 23-24 38 40 4 18 
January 20-21 37 40 6 18 
January 17-18 40 34 5 20 
January 10-11 36 42 4 17 




EU Leave EU 
Wouldn't 
vote Don't know 
2012 % % % % 
November 27-28 30 51 5 14 
October 22-23 28 49 5 17 
September 25-26 33 47 7 14 
August 28-29 32 47 7 15 
July 23-24 30 49 7 14 
July 5-6 31 48 4 17 
June 26-27 33 47 6 14 
May 17-18 28 51 6 15 
April 16-17 32 48 6 13 
March 25-26 34 44 5 18 
February 13-14 30 48 6 17 
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January 24-26 34 44 5 18 
2011     
December 15-16 41 41 5 14 
December 11-12 36 43 4 17 
December 8-9 35 44 5 15 
October 23-24 32 51 4 13 
August 7-8 30 52 4 15 
2010 % % % % 
September 8-9 33 47 5 14 
 
Imagine the British government under David Cameron renegotiated our 
relationship with Europe and said that Britain's interests were now protected, and 
David Cameron recommended that Britain remain a member of the European 
Union on the new terms. 
How would you then vote in a referendum on the issue? 
 
Remain in 
EU Leave EU 
Wouldn't 
vote Don't know 
2014 % % % % 
March 23-24 54 25 5 17 
March 9-10 52 27 5 16 
February 9-10 47 27 7 18 
January 12-13 48 29 6 18 
2013     
November 10-11 51 25 5 19 
October 13-14 52 28 4 16 
September 15-16 50 29 4 17 
August 18-19 48 31 5 16 
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August 4-5 50 28 5 17 
July 7-8 48 31 4 17 
June 9-10 50 28 5 17 
May 12-13 45 33 3 19 
May 9-10 45 32 4 20 
April 7-8 46 31 6 17 
February 17-18 52 28 5 14 
January 24-25 50 25 5 20 
January 23-24 52 25 5 17 
January 20-21 53 26 5 17 
January 17-18 55 22 5 18 
January 10-11 50 25 5 20 
2012     
July 5-6 42 34 5 19 
 
Would you support or oppose holding a referendum on Britain's relationship with 
Europe within the next few years? 
 Support Oppose 
Don’t 
know 
2013 % % % 
January 17-18 58 23 19 
January 10-11 59 21 20 
2012    
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Do you think Britain would be better or worse off economically if we left the 
European Union, or would it make no difference? 
 Better off Worse off 
No 
difference Don't know 
2014 % % % % 
April 6-7 29 37 18 16 
February 23-24 30 37 16 18 
January 26-27 32 38 12 18 
2013     
December 15-16 33 34 15 18 
November 24-25 33 34 16 18 
October 27-28 34 34 16 17 
September 29-30 32 32 18 18 
September 1-2 34 33 15 18 
July 21-22 32 34 17 17 
June 23-24 34 33 17 17 
May 19-20 34 31 15 19 
April 21-22 34 30 17 18 
March 17-18 35 34 16 16 
March 3-4 33 35 16 16 
February 3-4 30 36 15 18 
January 10-11 29 34 19 18 
 
Do you think Britain would have more or less influence in the world if we left the 
European Union, or would it make no difference? 
 
More 
influence Less influence No difference Don't know 
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2014 % % % % 
April 6-7 14 39 35 13 
February 23-24 13 40 34 13 
January 26-27 11 38 33 17 
2013     
December 15-16 13 38 35 14 
November 24-25 12 35 38 15 
October 27-28 12 38 37 14 
September 29-30 14 37 38 11 
September 1-2 9 37 40 14 
July 21-22 13 39 35 14 
June 23-24 13 36 38 13 
May 19-20 14 38 34 14 
April 21-22 13 37 38 13 
March 17-18 13 39 35 13 
March 3-4 12 41 36 11 
February 3-4 12 39 35 14 
January 10-11 9 40 38 14 
 
Do you think it would be good or bad for jobs and employment if Britain left the 
European Union, or would it make no difference? 
 
Good for 
jobs Bad for Jobs 
No 
difference Don't know 
2014 % % % % 
April 6-7 26 34 24 15 
February 23-24 28 32 22 17 
	   62	  
January 26-27 28 32 23 18 
2013     
December 15-16 34 30 20 16 
November 24-25 33 29 20 18 
October 27-28 32 31 19 18 
September 29-30 34 28 21 17 
September 1-2 35 30 17 18 
July 21-22 29 33 20 18 
June 23-24 32 30 22 16 
May 19-20 32 30 21 18 
April 21-22 35 27 22 17 
March 17-18 33 30 21 17 
March 3-4 34 28 21 16 
February 3-4 32 31 22 16 
January 10-11 27 30 24 19 
 
And do you think you personally would be better or worse off if we left the 
European Union, or would it make no difference? 
 Better off Worse off 
No 
difference Don't know 
2014 % % % % 
April 6-7 22 23 40 15 
February 23-24 19 21 43 17 
January 26-27 19 22 43 17 
2013     
December 15-16 23 20 38 18 
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November 24-25 22 19 41 19 
October 27-28 23 19 39 18 
September 29-30 21 18 42 18 
September 1-2 22 19 41 18 
July 21-22 21 23 38 19 
June 23-24 22 21 40 17 
May 19-20 22 21 38 19 
April 21-22 21 17 45 17 
March 17-18 25 19 38 18 
March 3-4 20 21 41 19 
February 3-4 21 20 42 17 
January 10-11 18 20 40 22 
 
Resource: YouGov 2014.  
